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A CONFLICT PRIMACY MODEL OF 
THE PUBLIC BOARD 
Usha Rodrigues* 
The board of directors is the theoretical fulcrum of the corporate 
form: statutes task the board with managing the corporation.  Yet in 
the twentieth century, CEOs and other executives came to dominate 
the real-world control of the corporation.  In light of this transfor-
mation, in the 1970s Melvin E. Eisenberg proposed reconceiving the 
board as an independent monitor.  Eisenberg’s monitoring board is 
now the dominant regulatory model of the board.  Recently two dif-
ferent visions of the board of directors have emerged.  Stephen Bain-
bridge’s “director primacy” model calls directors “Platonic guardi-
ans,” and Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s “team production model” 
characterizes them as “mediating hierarchs.”  Each of these models 
involves different conceptions of the board, but both theories presume 
that boards should play a central role in corporate governance. 
The reality of today’s public corporate board, however, is one of 
limited information, constrained time, and uncertain ability.  The re-
forms of the past three decades have left us with supermajority inde-
pendent boards—boards, that is, composed mostly of outsiders.  
There is no guarantee that the directors populating these boards have 
any knowledge of the corporation in general or of the particulars of 
the business they serve.  With one exception (the financial expert), 
they need not have advanced degrees or a minimum level of experi-
ence in business or management.  The only quality they must have is 
independence, defined as a lack of ties to the corporation.  This chief 
strength of the board is also a weakness, because it means that most 
members of the board rely on the CEO for knowledge of the corpora-
tion and its business. 
The centrality of independence to modern boards requires us to 
rethink their essential role.  I do so here by articulating and defending 
a “conflict primacy” model of the public company board.  In my 
view, expecting a group dominated by outsiders to oversee and vote 
 
 *  Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.  I thank participants in the In the 
Boardroom symposium (particularly Nicola Faith Sharpe for organizing the valuable event), partici-
pants in a Georgia Law roundtable, the UCLA Junior Business Law Faculty Forum, Kelli Alces, Ste-
phen M. Bainbridge, Dan Coenen, Peter Conti-Brown, Jim Smith, and Larry Thompson.  Sajid Saleem 
provided valuable research assistance.  Any errors are my own.   
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on substantive managerial decisions about the corporation—about 
the proper approach to labor disputes, when to expand the corpora-
tion, how to expend corporate resources—simply does not make 
sense.  What does make sense is for the board to police situations in 
which the self-interest of the corporation’s day-to-day managers im-
pedes their ability to function effectively.  The board’s central role, 
then, should concern monitoring CEO performance and pay (includ-
ing the removal power and succession planning), overseeing the audit 
function, and dealing with takeovers and derivative suits.  In such ar-
eas of conflict of interest the board’s lack of ties to management be-
comes a strength, and so it is on these subjects that the board should 
focus.  Perhaps controversially, the conflict primacy model would re-
duce the role of CEOs on the board, demoting them to nonvoting, ex 
officio status.  Reconstituted in this manner as a more fully independ-
ent body, the board of directors would have a clear but circumscribed 
mandate that comports with its modern character.  Part-timers are not 
well situated to second-guess executives, but are well equipped to 
manage conflicts of interest. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With every financial crisis or scandal comes the cry “Where were 
the boards?” and a call for boards to “do more.”1  This Article argues 
that these calls stem from a misunderstanding of what the modern board 
of a public corporation looks like and what it is best able to do.  We ask 
today’s public company boards to do too much with too little.  We should 
not, at least unthinkingly, ask them to do more. 
In the view of most corporate law scholars, the ideal board engages 
actively in the life of the corporation.  It thus should obtain exhaustive 
knowledge of the corporation’s inner workings, its supply chains, its cus-
tomer base and potential for growth, the corporation’s industry and chief 
competitors.  Ever alert for opportunities for growth, it should guide the 
corporation toward new revenue opportunities, whether in social media 
or around the globe.  The board should plan for liquidity crises and be 
alert to macroeconomic trends and regulatory changes that could affect 
the business.  It should likewise monitor natural catastrophes and politi-
cal upheavals of consequence to the bottom line.  It should ensure that 
the management team functions harmoniously, awarding compensation 
in a thoughtful manner calculated to create the right incentives, and 
stepping in swiftly when dissent occurs.  One might call this the “Platonic 
Ideal” model of the corporate board. 
 
 1. Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 718–19 (2009/2010) 
(asking whether the board did its job in the wake of the Citigroup bailout); Jennifer S. Taub, Able but 
Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 
843, 864 (2009) (noting the increased concern over conflicts after the collapses of Enron and World-
Com); John Schnatter, Editorial, Where Were the Boards?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2008, at A11 (blaming 
the boards of directors for failure to oversee management during the financial crisis). 
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To achieve this Platonic Ideal, reform efforts over the past three 
decades have moved in one direction: increasing independence.2  Inde-
pendence has gone from a recommended “best practice” to a legal re-
quirement, enshrined in Sarbanes-Oxley and in the listing requirements 
of the stock exchanges.3  Regulators also have defined independence ever 
more stringently, assiduously addressing the problem of “grey” directors, 
or directors who are independent only as a matter of technical labeling.4 
I am skeptical that we can define our way to “true” independence, 
but assume for the sake of argument that we can at least come close.  In-
dependence is the lack of a quality—the absence of ties to management.  
It does not ensure creation of the Platonic Ideal board.  If a corporation 
were to select nine undergraduates—or tinkers or tailors or soldiers or 
sailors—at random, it would probably wind up with a perfectly inde-
pendent board.  It is considerably less likely to have created the Platonic 
Ideal board. 
When I say that we ask public company boards to do too much with 
too little, I mean that the dominant regulatory philosophy pushes corpo-
rations towards the unattainable Platonic Ideal and then takes boards to 
task when they fall short.  By fetishizing independence, we have created 
boards of individuals especially ill-suited to monitoring the corporation’s 
full range of work.  By definition, independent directors have no internal 
ties to the corporation.  Rather, they have outside employment, unless 
they are retired.  We cannot fairly expect a board of part-timers to func-
tion as the Platonic Ideal board.  Some of today’s public corporations 
may have such boards.  But if so, it is all but a miracle. 
There is, I argue, a profound problem at work here.  It is that corpo-
rate law theory is out of touch with corporate practice reality.  Corporate 
law tasks the board with running the corporation; it delegates the day-to-
day management to the chief executive officers and their executive team, 
 
 2. I have in prior work distinguished between an outside director and an independent director.  
See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447 (2008).  In that article, I 
differentiate outside director status from the notion of independence as applied by Delaware courts.  
In this piece, I bow to the prevailing wording and use the term “independence” to denote outside di-
rector status. 
 3. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 77577 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)) (requiring that an audit committee be comprised of independent directors); see 
NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.06 (2012), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/ 
LCM/Sections (audit committee); id. § 303A.05 (compensation committee); id. § 303A.04 (nominating 
committee); NASD DEALERS MANUAL § 4350(d) (2006), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet. 
com/NASDAQ/pdf/predecessor_rule_text.pdf (audit committee); id. § 4350(c) (compensation and 
nominating committees); see also NYSE MKT LLC COMPANY GUIDE § 803 (2010), available at 
http://wallstreet.cch.com/AMEX/CompanyGuide (audit committee); id. § 804 (requiring all nominat-
ing committee members to be independent); id. § 805 (requiring all compensation committee members 
to be independent). 
 4. Listing Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 (2012) (defining in-
dependence for members of audit committees); Listing Standards for Compensation Committees 77 
Fed. Reg. 38,422 (July 27, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10C-1) (compensation committees); 
Carlo Osi, Family Business Governance and Independent Directors: The Challenges Facing an Inde-
pendent Family Business Board, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 181, 19495 (2009). 
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but the board remains in charge.  Melvin Eisenberg’s revolutionary vi-
sion of the board as independent monitor now dominates corporate gov-
ernance.5  Two notable new theories of corporate governance—Margaret 
Blair and Lynn Stout’s team production model6 and Stephen Bain-
bridge’s director primacy model7—similarly place the board at the center 
of the corporation.  But business realities have caused all these models to 
founder: today’s public corporation is dominated by outside directors, 
who have limited information about the corporation and little time to 
oversee its operations. 
It didn’t have to be this way.  The board is an inherently protean 
body, capable of flexing and stretching to serve the needs of a broad 
spectrum of corporations.  State corporate law by its nature necessitates 
such flexibility, given the fact that the same basic corporate code serves 
the needs of both tiny “mom and pop” corporations and Fortune 50 be-
hemoths.8  As Bainbridge has pointed out, the literature identifies three 
functions for the public board: (1) monitoring and disciplining manage-
ment, (2) providing advice and guidance to managers, and (3) providing 
a network of useful business contacts.9  Some boards will do more with 
one function, more with the other.  The board mechanism, in state statu-
tory construction at least, adapts to serve them all. 
Enter the feds.  As Mark Roe and others10 have elaborated, the 
states do not regulate in a vacuum, particularly where public corpora-
tions are concerned.  A mixture of disclosure requirements that thinly 
veil substantive requirements, exchange rules, and best practices pressure 
have combined to effect a species of federal intervention into the compo-
sition of the public company board.  This intervention has enshrined a 
monitoring model, one dependent on an independent board.  As I have 
written elsewhere, the federal understanding of independence is status-
driven, and far removed from the more functional definition of inde-
pendence that Delaware applies.11 
 
 5. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS (1976) [hereinafter EISENBERG, STRUCTURE]; STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 53 (2012) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE] (“Although the modern understanding of the board’s role and function has no single 
parent, if one were to insist on finding someone to whom to give the bulk of the credit—or blame—the 
leading candidate probably would be Professor Melvin Eisenberg.”). 
 6. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).   
 7. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Govern-
ance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Primacy].   
 8. I put to one side the statutory close corporations, as they are relatively seldom used and hov-
er on the periphery of corporate practice. 
 9. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 49–50, 61. 
 10. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate 
Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573 (2005); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 
(2003). 
 11. The Model Business Corporation Act uses the more specific term “qualified director” for the 
same purpose.  See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.43 (2011). 
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This federal intrusion has meant that some of the expectations the 
law and corporate reformers alike have for the board are now unrealistic.  
Accordingly, this Article suggests a way of reconstituting and reframing 
the board of directors to address the disconnect between the theoretical 
power and actual impotence of the public board.  Today, because our law 
effectively requires that most public board members be independent, the 
quality of independence has become the defining feature of boards.  Giv-
en this reality, this Article advocates disqualifying full-time employees 
from board membership altogether, thus relegating CEOs to an observer 
status that permits them to attend most meetings but not to vote.  This 
fully independent board would focus solely on areas where manage-
ment’s interests conflict with those of the corporation as a whole: execu-
tive compensation, audit, takeovers, derivative suits, and related party 
transactions.  Liberated from the foolish notion that it can effectively 
manage corporate strategy, the board could focus on those areas in which 
independence is an asset rather than a liability. 
I pause to note that I confine my remarks to public companies only, 
and to those without a dominant shareholder.  The private firm is a horse 
of a different color.  It often has few independent directors, and fre-
quently large shareholders serve both as board members and execu-
tives.12  Insiders make up a considerable portion of the board and have 
the time, knowledge, and motivation to manage daily corporate affairs.  
The board in such corporations will presumably continue to play a vital 
managerial role.  Likewise, in public corporations where a single share-
holder or group possesses a “control block,” that owner can assert con-
trol over the corporation by way of the board, and can generally expect 
that board to govern in accordance with his or her wishes.13  These two 
cases, then, I set to one side. 
My argument proceeds as follows.  Part II describes the accepted 
view of the board as the manager of the corporation.  Part III describes 
how poorly today’s boards are suited to manage.  Part IV proposes a con-
flict primacy theory of the board of directors, describing how it would 
work and tying it to Melvin Eisenberg’s original description of the moni-
toring board.  Part V addresses some objections, and Part VI concludes. 
II. THE CENTRALITY OF THE BOARD TO CORPORATE LAW IN THEORY 
Boards are the crux of the corporation—at least in legal theory.  
Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law requires that 
“[t]he business and affairs of every corporation organized under this 
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of direc-
 
 12. Mark K. Fiegener et al., CEO Stakes and Board Composition in Small Private Firms, 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY & PRAC., Summer 2000, at 5 (finding that small private firms are less 
likely to have independent board compositions).   
 13. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (2008).   
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tors.”14  Similarly, the Model Business Corporation Act requires each 
corporation to have a board of directors.15  It provides: “All corporate 
powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of direc-
tors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation 
shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, 
of its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the articles 
of incorporation . . . .”16  As Stephen Bainbridge observes, “The key 
players in the statutory decision-making structure are the corporation’s 
directors.”17 
Despite the central role the board plays in statutes, in practice the 
CEO and other executives have long dominated corporate life.  In his 
landmark book, The Structure of the Corporation,18 published in 1976, 
Melvin Eisenberg challenged the insider-dominated boards of the day, 
positing that the modern board should serve as an independent monitor 
that works to safeguard shareholder interests.19  Cheek-by-jowl with the 
independent board, the shareholder primacy theory gained prominence, 
becoming the “dominant” view of the corporation.20  Shareholder prima-
cy holds that the purpose of the corporation is ultimately to serve the in-
terests of its shareholders.  As the corporation’s residual claimants, 
shareholders’ interests should be the focus of corporate decision makers, 
and shareholders’ power to vote for the board highlights this purpose.21  
The independent board thus monitors managers to ensure that they run 
the corporation for the benefit of the shareholders.22 
Recent challenges to the shareholder-centric view of the corpora-
tion have come from Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team production 
model and Stephen Bainbridge’s director primacy model, both of which 
likewise focus on the pivotal role played by boards of directors.  Each 
model provides a calculated response to shareholder empowerment.  
Crucially, each model hinges on an active and powerful board of direc-
 
 14. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2013). 
 15. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01.  The exception to section 8.01 is corporations governed by 
shareholders, which are covered in MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32. 
 16. Id. § 8.01(b).   
 17. Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 7, at 559. 
 18. EISENBERG, STRUCTURE, supra note 5. 
 19. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: 
Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 145 (2008) (“Eisenberg’s monitoring 
model of the board of directors has ever since been the main focus of legal corporate governance.”). 
 20. Id. at 100 n.2 (citing Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corpo-
rate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that 
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”)); Mark J. Roe, The 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 
(2001) (noting that “[s]hareholder wealth maximization is usually accepted as the appropriate goal in 
American business circles” without normatively endorsing the proposition). 
 21. Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 975, 977 (2006). 
 22. Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional Sharehold-
ers?, 60 BUS. LAW. 1, 17 (2004) (describing the ALI’s Corporate Governance Project). 
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tors.  As Part III describes, the public boards of today in fact function 
very differently than these models envision. 
With the director primacy theory, Bainbridge seeks to explain why 
the law places the board of directors at the center of the web of contracts 
that is the corporation.  He views them “as a sort of Platonic guardian—a 
sui generis body serving as the nexus for the various contracts making up 
the corporation and whose powers flow not from shareholders alone, but 
from the complete set of contracts constituting the firm.”23  While in his 
view the corporation is ultimately run for the shareholders, for Bain-
bridge corporate law statutes are justified in centering corporate decision 
making with the board, and moves to empower shareholders are thus 
wrongheaded and counterproductive. 
The chief virtue of the public corporation, in Bainbridge’s view, is 
that “it provides a hierarchical decisionmaking structure well-suited to 
the problem of operating a large business enterprise with numerous em-
ployees, managers, shareholders, creditors, and other inputs.”24  He fur-
ther observes:  
In such a firm, someone must be in charge: “Under conditions of 
widely dispersed information and the need for speed in decisions, 
authoritative control at the tactical level is essential for success.”  In 
other words, someone must possess the right to make, by fiat, deci-
sions binding on the whole firm.25 
Bainbridge concludes that the statutes are right to entrust power of fiat 
with the board.26 
Bainbridge’s bête noire is shareholder empowerment; he vociferous-
ly objects to those that would grant shareholders more robust voting 
rights or more voice in corporate governance.27  Given this concern, it is 
in some sense logical for him to turn to the board of directors as a locus 
of power.  What he objects to is not that the corporation be run for the 
shareholders—indeed, he embraces the desideratum of shareholder 
 
 23. Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 7, at 560. 
 24. Id. at 572. 
 25. Id. (quoting another source). 
 26. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors As Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 
20 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Nexus] (“In the public corporation . . . fiat is essential.  All organi-
zations must have some mechanism for aggregating the preferences of the organization’s constituen-
cies and converting them into collective decisions.”).  Part III expresses skepticism as to whether the 
board, as opposed to the CEO, can actually exercise authority swiftly and effectively enough to fulfill 
the need for tactical control that Bainbridge describes.   
 27. Bainbridge accurately describes U.S corporate law as being director-focused, rather than  
shareholder-focused:  
Shareholders exercise virtually no control over either day-to-day operations or long-term policy.  
Instead, control is vested in the hands of the board of directors. . . . Under all corporation stat-
utes, the vast majority of corporate decisions are assigned to the board of directors or their sub-
ordinates acting alone.  Shareholders essentially have no power to initiate corporate action and 
are entitled to approve or disapprove only a very few board actions. . . . The statute thus recog-
nizes that the board of directors hires capital, not vice-versa. 
Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 7, at 573–74.  
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wealth maximization.28  But the shareholders themselves cannot be in 
charge of the corporation, or they lose the benefits of the separation of 
ownership and control.  For him, the benefit of a board lies in having a 
group apart from the shareholders that can exercise authority for the 
corporation.  This ability explains the existence and centrality of the 
board in the eyes of the law. 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout likewise focus on the board of direc-
tors, which they characterize as “mediating hierarchs,” in developing 
their team production model of the corporation.  They argue that the 
corporate form allows various corporate participants to give up rights in 
order to allow for combined investment and coordination.29  The direc-
tors play the central role of coordinating the different corporate stake-
holders.30 
The team production model, like Bainbridge’s, seeks to counter a 
theory of shareholder primacy.  Thus, “boards exist not to protect share-
holders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the 
members of the corporate ‘team,’ including shareholders, managers, rank 
and file employees, and possibly other groups, such as creditors.”31  Blair 
and Stout thus criticize the characterization of directors as merely the 
agents of the shareholders,32 pointing out that shareholders, unlike typi-
cal principals, do not—and cannot—tell directors what to do.  They de-
pict directors not as agents but rather as trustees, who “once elected, be-
come the ultimate decisionmaking authority within the firm.”33  
Directors, in this view, have “tremendous discretion to sacrifice share-
holders’ interests in favor of management, employees, and creditors, in 
deciding what is best for ‘the firm.’”34 
Bainbridge justifies the law’s anointing of the board as ultimate au-
thority of the corporation, reasoning that, given that there must be an ul-
timate authority, it is better to entrust that function to a group.35  Blair 
and Stout vest the board with power because it is a neutral collective en-
tity, and therefore able to credibly mediate disagreements among various 
corporate constituencies.36  Although different in approach, both Bain-
bridge and Blair and Stout, then, concur with the framework of our cor-
porate statutes by conceptualizing corporate control as lodged with the 
board of directors.  Whether directors serve as “mediating hierarchs” or 
as “Platonic guardians,” they are expected to serve as the corporation’s 
 
 28. Id. at 563. 
 29. Blair & Stout, supra note 6, at 249–51. 
 30. Id. at 251. 
 31. Id. at 253. 
 32. Id. at 290. 
 33. Id. at 291.  Because directors have “free rein to consider and make trade-offs between the 
conflicting interests of different corporate constituencies,” they cannot fairly be described as mere 
agents of the shareholders.  Id.  
 34. Id. 
 35. See Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 7. 
 36. See Blair & Stout, supra note 6. 
RODRIGUES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/24/2013  1:54 PM 
No. 3] A CONFLICT PRIMACY MODEL OF THE PUBLIC BOARD 1059 
ultimate decision makers—in short, to run the firm.  The next Part de-
scribes how ill-suited the modern public board is to serving this would-be 
role. 
III. THE MARGINALIZATION OF THE MODERN BOARD IN PRACTICE 
Public company boards today are supermajority independent, 
meaning that most directors are not company insiders.  Indeed, increas-
ing board independence has been the chief focus of corporate govern-
ance reform for the past thirty years.  Ironically, this move toward inde-
pendence has weakened boards by populating them with individuals who 
possess little information about the corporation, and who have little time 
to make use of what little information they have.  This Part first describes 
the move toward increased board-member independence and then de-
scribes the problems independence reforms have created. 
A. Why More Independence 
Over the last thirty years, the boards of public corporations have 
undergone a gradual yet dramatic transformation.  In the 1960s most 
boards had a majority of in-house, non-independent directors serving a 
largely functionary role.37  The evolution of U.S. corporate boards from 
homogeneous, insider-dominated clubs to majority-independent institu-
tions tracks the rise of the concept of the monitoring board.  If a board’s 
principal role is to monitor management, then “implicit in that role is a 
director’s ability to exercise judgment independent from management.”38  
Thanks to the widespread adoption of Eisenberg’s monitoring board, 
most boards today have a supermajority of outside, independent direc-
tors.39 
Developments in the 1970s ranging from the Penn Central Railroad 
bankruptcy and Watergate scandal to the birth of the corporate social re-
sponsibility movement led to the support for empowering independent 
directors.40  By the end of the 1970s, the ideal board became a “monitor-
ing” board rather than a rubber-stamping, merely titular body.41  Note 
 
 37. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1513–14 (2007) (“This conception 
fit with the idea of an advisory board that included many insiders and outsiders with important eco-
nomic relationships with the firm, such as bankers, lawyers, and suppliers.  Such knowledgeable parties 
could serve as a useful sounding board for the CEO, a kitchen cabinet, and could provide expertise in 
the face of increasing complexity.  In an important sense, boards were an extension of management.”). 
 38. Elizabeth Cosenza, The Holy Grail of Corporate Governance Reform: Independence or De-
mocracy?, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1, 18–19.   
 39. Eisenberg served as reporter for the ALI’s Corporate Governance Project, which focused on 
the monitoring role independent directors should play.  John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corpo-
rate Law and the Longterm Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 
1363–64 (1992). 
 40. Gordon, supra note 37, at 1514–18. 
 41. Id. at 1518. 
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that, as Part IV.F describes, from the beginning, board monitoring meant 
monitoring the CEO.  The board was not meant to be some free-floating 
ombudsperson charged with fly-specking every little corporate matter as 
it arose.  Instead, the core job of the board was to monitor the CEO’s 
performance.42  Therefore a board free of conflicts of interest—that is, of 
ties to that CEO or to the CEO’s management team—would best suit the 
task at hand. 
Today’s boards of directors are “independent”: that is, they are 
made up of a majority of outside directors, who are not employed by the 
corporation on whose board they sit.  Regulatory requirements explain 
much of the shift to the independent board.  Reacting to the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 effectively required 
an independent audit committee,43 and (at the SEC’s behest) the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ each required listing firms 
to have a majority independent board, and independent nomination and 
compensation committees.44  Even before Sarbanes-Oxley, however, best 
practices dictated that boards move toward ever-greater board inde-
pendence.45  Formalizing what was by then a de facto requirement, the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
mandated that publicly traded companies have independent compensa-
tion committees.46  In reality, today most public corporations have su-
permajority independent boards; indeed, often the CEO is the only em-
ployee-director.47 
B. The Problem With Independence 
In theory, outside directors bring a fresh, unbiased, expert perspec-
tive to the task of corporate management.  In practice, however, outside 
directors rely heavily on top management.  The American Bar Associa-
tion Task Force on Corporate Responsibility noted that many aspects of 
an outside director’s role reflect a dependence on senior management: 
“Typically, senior management plays a significant part in the selection of 
directors, in proposing the compensation for directors, in selecting their 
 
 42. See infra Part IV.F. 
 43. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 303, 116 Stat. 745, 778 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 7242). 
 44. Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, 
and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 97981 (2003); see NYSE LISTED COMPANY 
MANUAL, supra note 3, § 303A.06; id. § 303A.04 (nominating committee); NASD DEALERS MANUAL, 
supra note 3, § 4350(d) (audit committee); id. § 4350(c) (compensation and nominating committees); 
see also NYSE MKT LLC COMPANY GUIDE § 803 (2010), available at http://wallstreet.cch.com/ 
AMEX/CompanyGuide/ (audit committee); id. § 804 (requiring all nominating committee members to 
be independent); id. § 805 (requiring all compensation committee members to be independent). 
 45. Gordon, supra note 37, at 1481.   
 46. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3). 
 47. In 2007, the average board was made up of ten directors, eight of whom were outside direc-
tors.  KORN/FERRY INST., 34TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 6 (2008). 
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committee assignments, in setting agendas for their meetings, and in 
evaluating their performance.”48 
Even if directors are not hand-picked by the CEO, they inevitably 
rely heavily on officers in doing their work.  As Kelli Alces has ex-
plained:  
[D]irectors learn from officers why the officers recommend a par-
ticular course of action and officers are not perceived as inferior to 
directors when the board makes most of its business decisions.  Ra-
ther, the officers present an idea to the board and advise directors 
and then the directors ask questions to determine if they agree with 
the officers’ judgment. . . . Directors have to rely heavily on officers 
for the judgment and information they use in performing their mon-
itoring tasks.49 
Indeed, even if directors ask for additional information, that information 
will generally be created by or under the supervision of corporate offic-
ers.50 
No less importantly, part-time outside directors face information 
asymmetries relative to the managers of the companies they serve.  As 
Stephen Bainbridge has pointed out, “Outsiders by definition need more 
information and are likely to take longer to persuade than are insiders.”51  
Initial corporate governance reform focused on ensuring better infor-
mation for the board, particularly through reports made by public ac-
countants.52  Still, as Lisa Fairfax points out, these gatekeepers them-
selves rely on insiders for information.  In addition, they may be subject 
to their own conflicts of interest.  For example, the Arthur Andersen 
partner in charge of Enron’s audit and the Vinson & Elkins partner rep-
resenting the firm relied on Enron for so much revenue that they func-
tioned more as corporate ushers than as gatekeepers.53  Professor Fairfax 
terms these asymmetries the “knowledge deficit.”54 
The ways in which board members receive information are also 
problematic.  Directors typically obtain information shortly before board 
meetings and this material is often voluminous and poorly organized.55  
As Nicola Sharpe describes: “[D]irectors receive information packets 
prepared by the CEO or by the executives who work for her; directors 
rarely have channels outside of the CEO for information gathering.  If 
 
 48. James H. Cheek, III et al., Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force 
on Corporate Responsibility, 54 MERCER L. REV. 789, 799 (2003).   
 49. Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 795 (2011). 
 50. Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, Reality Check on Officer Liability, 67 BUS. LAW. 75, 82 
(2011). 
 51. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 87. 
 52. EISENBERG, STRUCTURE, supra note 5, at 186–211; Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the 
Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 161–62 (2010). 
 53. Fairfax, supra note 52, at 162–64. 
 54. Id. at 165. 
 55. Nicola Faith Sharpe, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate Boards, 34 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 1435, 1454 (2011). 
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executive management’s vision of the company is flawed, the board’s in-
formation will share the same flaws.”56 
The average director spends roughly twenty hours a month on the 
governance of his or her company.57  One 2011 survey found that roughly 
half of North American CEOs believed their boards were well-prepared 
at meetings.58  Only forty-six percent believed that boards “understand 
the factors that drive performance in each of the [firm’s] main business-
es.”59  It is no surprise, then, that board members lack the sort of exper-
tise that company insiders possess. 
Given the limitations on directors’ time and the quality of the in-
formation they receive,60 it is no wonder that empirical studies fail to in-
dicate that adopting a majority independent board leads to improved fi-
nancial performance.  Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black, for example, 
found that  
[f]irms with more independent boards (proxied by the fraction of 
independent directors minus the fraction of inside directors) do not 
achieve improved profitability, and there are hints in our data that 
they perform worse than other firms.  This evidence suggests that 
the conventional wisdom on the importance of board independence 
lacks empirical support.61 
Professor Jeffrey Gordon’s response to these studies questioning 
the value of independent boards is to argue that the most significant posi-
tive effects of the independence movement have been systematic.62  In 
other words, while the individual gains to a particular firm from increas-
ing independence might be negligible, overall independence has im-
proved both the quality of disclosure and the market-wide level of legal 
compliance—both worthy benefits.63  Furthermore, Gordon argues that 
as the SEC has required the disclosure of ever more and more detailed 
information, stock prices have become more informative, and thus inde-
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 50, at 80; MARTIN LIPTON ET AL., SOME THOUGHTS FOR 
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN 2012, at 5 (2011), available at http://www.wlrk.com/files/2012/Some 
ThoughtsforBoardsofDirectorsin2012.pdf (“The 2011 Public Company Governance Survey of the Na-
tional Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) suggests that public company directors spent an 
average of over 227 hours performing board-related activities in 2011.”). 
 58. COLIN B. CARTER & JAY W. LORSCH, BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD: DESIGNING 
CORPORATE BOARDS FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 26 (2004).   
 59. Id. at 24 tbl.2-1. 
 60. As Stephen Bainbridge rightly points out, the independence fetish has other costs, among 
them the need to incentivize outside directors to monitor and the loss of benefits of insider representa-
tion, including providing insight into situations where bad outcomes are outside managerial control, 
and providing a conduit of information and trust between management and the board.  See 
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 102–03.  While such costs are real, for the 
purposes of this Article I take the position that the war of independence has already been lost.  Insider 
board representation is unlikely to reemerge. 
 61. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and 
Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002). 
 62. Gordon, supra note 37, at 1508–09. 
 63. Id. 
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pendent directors can rely more on outside performance signals to assess 
the performance of the CEO and the management team.64 
Certainly, at least up to a point, increasing the amount and quality 
of disclosure makes a corporation’s stock price more accurately reflect 
the firm’s performance, and thus lessens the information asymmetry de-
scribed above.  Yet a company’s stock price performance is a crude and 
binary indicator.  As discussed in Part IV.C below, it may serve as a val-
uable tool to evaluate CEO performance, allowing as it does benchmark-
ing against industry peers.  But if a firm’s stock price is languishing, that 
fact only tells the board that something is amiss.  It does not offer guid-
ance as to which strategic path to take—that question is one of firm man-
agement.  And yet, as the next Section will describe, many of the tasks 
public boards are exhorted to undertake involve just such managerial 
calls, which an independent board lacks the know-how to make.  The 
blunt instrument of stock performance serves as a poor substitute for in-
side knowledge of the firm.   
This Section first described the evolution of the modern independ-
ent board of directors.  It next outlined the problems independence poses 
for the directors of today’s public corporations: they come from outside 
the corporation, and, perhaps, outside the industry.  They have limited 
channels through which to communicate with insiders and depend heavi-
ly on management for information.65  They have limited time and atten-
tion to devote to conducting the business of the corporation.66  Empirical 
studies show that independence does not positively correlate with firm 
performance in general.67  Even if the rise in independent boards and 
concomitant increase in reliability of stock price as an indicator of firm 
performance has made it easier for boards to monitor the performance of 
the executives, these developments fail to provide the kind of working 
knowledge of firm or industry that could guide independent directors 
seeking to manage the firm.  In other words, more accurate stock prices 
make it easier for independent directors to monitor managers’ perfor-
mance, but not for them to manage the firm itself.  Yet there is little like-
lihood of reforms that will require or incentivize the creation of less in-
dependent boards—politically, a push to bring more insiders onto boards 
would be difficult to justify.  The independent board is here to stay.68 
  
 
 64. Gordon, supra note 37, at 1541–43. 
 65. See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. 
 66. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. 
 67. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 61. 
 68. Reform usually happens only when a catalytic problem emerges—generally fraud.  Putting 
more insiders on the board will never seem like the solution when managers loot or mismanage, which 
is the only time reform occurs.  See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of 
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: 
Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011). 
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C. Where Theory Meets Practice: Boards Are Asked to Manage More 
with Less 
The modern public board’s responsibilities lie in two areas: moni-
toring the activities of the corporate executives and managing the corpo-
ration’s business affairs.69  The board’s monitoring responsibilities pri-
marily involve appointing the CEO and evaluating the management 
team.70  The board’s management responsibilities essentially involve hav-
ing the final say-so on major corporate issues, such as bringing suit on the 
corporation’s behalf, pursuing mergers and acquisitions, issuing of divi-
dends, and the like.71 
Descriptions of what boards do alternate between these twin re-
sponsibilities of management and monitoring.  Wachtell Lipton recently 
provided a long list of expectations for the board: 
 Choose the CEO, monitor his or her performance, and have a 
detailed succession plan in case the CEO becomes unavailable or 
fails to meet performance expectations. 
 Plan for and deal with crises, especially crises where the tenure of 
the CEO is in question, where there has been a major disaster, or 
where hard-earned reputation is threatened by product failure. 
 Determine executive compensation, achieving the delicate bal-
ance of enabling the company to recruit, retain and incentivize 
the most talented executives, while avoiding media and populist 
criticism for “excessive” compensation. 
 Interview and nominate director candidates, monitor and evalu-
ate the board’s own performance, and seek continuous improve-
ment in board performance. 
 Provide business and strategic advice to management and ap-
prove the company’s budgets and long-term strategy. 
 Determine the company’s risk appetite (financial, safety, reputa-
tion, etc.), set state-of-the-art standards for managing risk, and 
monitor the management of those risks. 
 Monitor the performance of the corporation and evaluate it 
against the economy as a whole and the performance of peer 
companies. 
 Set state-of-the-art standards for compliance with legal and regu-
latory requirements, monitor compliance, and respond appropri-
ately to “red flags.” 
 
 69. See, e.g., Alces, supra note 49, at 790–805 (discussing the dual monitoring and management 
functions of the modern board). 
 70. See Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 269–71 (1997). 
 71. See Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors 
in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 668 (2003). 
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 Take center stage whenever there is a proposed transaction that 
creates a seeming conflict between the best interests of stock-
holders and those of management, including takeovers, mergers, 
and restructuring transactions. 
 Set the standards of social responsibility of the company, includ-
ing human rights, and monitor performance and compliance with 
those standards. 
 Oversee government and community relations. 
 Pay close attention to investor relations and interface with share-
holders in appropriate situations. 
 Adopt corporate governance guidelines and committee char-
ters.72 
Whew!  The sheer length of this list of responsibilities is overwhelm-
ing, especially when one considers that they will be performed by a group 
designedly composed of individuals who do not work full-time—or even 
nearly full-time—for the corporation.  To be sure, some of these tasks 
entail the kind of work an outsider would be well placed to provide—
such as monitoring the CEO, the performance of the corporation, and 
compliance regimes.  Other tasks are more strategic in nature, requiring 
the kind of judgment calls an outsider would likely face considerable 
handicaps when making: overseeing government and community rela-
tions, determining the company’s risk appetite, setting standards of social 
responsibility, and approving budgets and long-term strategy.  These are 
important questions, without a doubt.  The current corporate governance 
structure cedes them to a body without the time or expertise to carry 
them out. 
While this description of board responsibilities is notable for its de-
tail, tasking the board with a direct managerial function is common.73  In 
a perceptive article questioning the modern-day trend toward the super-
independent board, Lisa Fairfax covers both managerial and monitoring 
functions, describing the independent directors’ responsibility to: 
 guard against self-dealing by closely examining conflict-of-
interest transactions to ensure that they benefit the corporation. 
 detect and prevent fraud because their active oversight decreases 
managers’ ability to engage in wrongdoing. 
 prevent managerial shirking and thus enhance corporate perfor-
mance because they can proactively examine corporate affairs, 
 
 72. MARTIN LIPTON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS 1–2 (2010), available at http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/ 
WLRK.18080.10.pdf 
 73. This despite the fact that the relevant corporate statutes plainly allow for less direct board 
management, providing that the corporation is to be managed “by or under the direction of a board of 
directors.”  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2013). 
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not only to ensure that managers are productive, but also to en-
sure that managers make the most efficient and effective deci-
sions.74 
Note how the first two functions deal overtly with managerial con-
flicts of interest: first, self-dealing, and second, fraud detection and pre-
vention—loosely, the audit function, ensuring that managers and their 
underlings are not lying to the public or breaking the law.  But the third 
function, which centers on ensuring that managers make the most effi-
cient and effective decisions for the corporation, seems a herculean task 
for the typical public company board.75  It envisions a sort of shadow 
management team made up of members whose only qualification is not 
the sort of context-specific expertise needed to manage, but instead the 
quality of independence, which inevitably carries with it a lack of firm-
specific managerial know-how. 
The managerial functions assigned to modern boards pose signifi-
cant challenges for their members.  As Part II showed, when it comes to 
managing the corporation, board members suffer from severe informa-
tional disadvantages because they have neither the time nor the compe-
tence to second-guess the managers upon whom they must rely for in-
formation.  The evidence suggests that, for this reason, modern boards 
merely rubber-stamp managerial decisions when asked to evaluate them.  
Some commentators bemoan this state of affairs.76  In contrast, I argue 
that such rubber-stamping is only natural, and the product of a misguided 
effort to make the part-time board do something it is constitutionally un-
fit to do: manage the corporation.  Expecting the modern supermajority 
independent board to actively manage the corporation is like giving blind 
people reading glasses and exhorting them to focus more.  Today we de-
pend on independence to produce an ability to manage well.  Yet inde-
pendence does not guarantee a good manager, just a lack of ties to man-
agement. 
 
 74. Fairfax, supra note 52, at 138. 
 75. In a similar vein, the most recent edition of the Corporate Director’s Guidebook describes as 
one of the board’s “principal responsibilities”—“to provide general direction and guidance with re-
spect to the corporation’s strategy and management’s conduct of the business.”  ABA Corporate Laws 
Comm., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 66 BUS. LAW. 975, 986 (2011).  
 76. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or 
Fantasy?, 45 BUS. LAW. 2055, 2056 (1990) (stating that outside boards rubber-stamp management ac-
tions); Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control 
Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 862–64 (1993) (explaining that politeness and courtesy in board culture dis-
courages candor in boardrooms, and thus lead to less active monitoring by a board); Laura Lin, The 
Effectiveness of Outside Directors As a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 898, 914–16 (1996) (suggesting that a major constraint on outside directors’ ability to 
monitor is that the directors “may see major issues confronting the corporation through management’s 
eyes”).  
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IV. A CONFLICT PRIMACY VIEW OF THE BOARD 
A. The Problem with Modern Boards 
Kelli Alces perceptively diagnosed the problem with the public 
company board in a recent article: “The board of directors has outlived 
its purpose. . . . [R]esponsibility for the success or failure of the firm lies 
with a group of professionals, the board of directors, who work part time 
to monitor the firm’s business, and management, who receive almost all 
of their information about the firm secondhand.”77  She observes that 
corporate officers and investors (including creditors) are the “real corpo-
rate decision makers.”78 
Executives handle most corporate decisions.  They launch advertis-
ing campaigns, roll out new products, handle hiring and firing, and make 
the purchasing, renting, and selling decisions that comprise a corpora-
tion’s everyday existence.79  Even larger strategic decisions, like opening 
a new plant or launching a joint venture, are decisions for CEOs and 
their high-level advisors.80  They live and breathe the corporation.  As 
others have pointed out, part-time directors flown in to meet once a 
quarter—or even once a month—cannot hope to add much value to 
these decisions.  For us to expect them to do so is absurd. 
Alces’s solution is to do away with the board entirely.81  Acknowl-
edging, however, that such a radical departure from current practice—
and current law—would be difficult to effectuate, she suggests an inter-
mediate “investor board,” made up of representatives from creditors, 
shareholders, and labor.82  Alces’s board reconfiguration—for her, just a 
stepping stone on the pathway to board elimination—appears to create a 
new style of governance, one involving an overt constant negotiation be-
tween various factions.  In contrast, I still see a value to preserving the 
board as an institution—particularly given the fact that state corporate 
law applies to both public and private corporations.  There are many dif-
ferent kinds of firms, and the beauty of the board mechanism as con-
ceived by state statutes is that it can flex to reflect the different needs of 
the firm: a managerial board, an advisory board, or a conflicts board.83  
Federal intervention, by enshrining the independent board for the public 
corporation, has created an entity suitable for but one purpose, dealing 
 
 77. Alces, supra note 49, at 783.   
 78. Id. at 785. 
 79. Nicola Faith Sharpe, Process Over Structure: An Organizational Behavior Approach to Im-
proving Corporate Boards, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 261, 305 (2012) (“Specifically, overseeing the day-to-day 
operations of the company, setting strategy, ensuring firm profitability, and managing employees, are 
all tasks left to the CEO and her closest advisors.”). 
 80. Id. 
 81. She urges that the “now-vestigial board” should be allowed to “completely wither away.” 
Alces, supra note 49, at 786. 
 82. Id. at 808. 
 83. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 65. 
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with managerial conflict.  Yet this development does not logically entail 
eliminating the board, but merely acknowledging its limited utility—at 
least, in its public company supermajority independent incarnation. 
While acknowledging that Alces has accurately diagnosed the prob-
lem of the modern public board, I prescribe a different course of treat-
ment.  Rather than repopulating the board to make it more knowledgea-
ble about and invested in the corporation, I advocate embracing the very 
quality that prevents the modern board from serving as a viable day-to-
day manager.  The conflict primacy view of the board makes a virtue out 
of a vice by limiting the independent board’s responsibilities to those ar-
eas where independence matters: problems of conflict of interest.  Under 
my conflict primacy model, the board would monitor the CEO (including 
by setting compensation and planning for succession) and deal with man-
agerial conflicts of interest as they arise. 
B. No Executives Allowed; CEOs As ex Officio, Nonvoting Directors 
In confining the board to these areas I suggest one further change to 
boards: the elimination of any inside directors from the board, excepting 
only the CEO in an ex officio role.  This change would mean that public 
CEOs could no longer serve as voting members of the board of directors.  
While this change may seem drastic at first blush, my program of CEO-
demotion and other-officer-removal is only the logical last step in the di-
rector-independence movement.84 
Today’s supermajority boards rely unduly on the one or two man-
agers in their midst.85  Others have written about the harmful dynamic 
this situation creates, when board members thus become overly reliant 
on the CEO.  Professor Lawrence Mitchell notes that the advent of inde-
pendent boards has made boards overly dependent on the CEO for in-
formation and thus placed “the CEO in an enormously powerful posi-
tion, with every incentive to present information to the board in a light 
that is most favorable to him.”86  Further, because “[the CEO] has a mo-
 
 84. A perennial corporate governance recommendation is to institute nonexecutive board chairs, 
that is, to split the roles of CEO and chairman.  See id. at 104–05.  For my purposes this move amounts 
to a half-measure, harmful because it fails adequately to signal the proper relationship between public 
company board and CEO.  Proponents of splitting the roles argue that CEOs should not head the very 
organization tasked with evaluating them.  See id. at 106.  The conflict primacy model agrees with this 
view, and goes one step farther, arguing that the CEO should play no role—and have no vote—in situ-
ations of conflict. 
 85. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1023 (2010). 
 86. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies: The Missing 
Link in Corporate Governance, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1349 (2005) [hereinafter Mitchell, Structural 
Holes].  Mitchell offers a provocative solution: allowing shareholders, debtors, and employees to vote 
as separate classes for the CEO.  Lawrence E. Mitchell, On the Direct Election of CEOs, 32 OHIO N.U. 
L. REV. 261, 283–84 (2006).  Mitchell and I agree on the diagnosis of the problem, but his prescription 
seems problematic given the exigencies of corporate reality.  Most notably, he suggests a standard sev-
en-year contract for CEOs.  Id. at 284.  But poor performance or outside forces may demand CEO 
removal much earlier and more quickly than every seven years; a regular election seems a poor substi-
tute for the kind of quick succession judgments the modern public corporation may require.  And 
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nopoly over the information delivered to the [board],”87 such information 
“can easily be manipulated or suppressed by the CEO because of his po-
sition as the sole source of information.”88 
As Mitchell points out, increasing the independence of the rest of 
the board paradoxically reduces its autonomy by reducing the number of 
its information channels and making the remaining few sources all the 
more important.  Allowing CEOs to serve as an equal, voting member of 
the board both signals their importance to board operation and legiti-
mizes their voice as the only board member with actual day-to-day 
knowledge of the corporation. 
To be sure, CEOs’ knowledge can be invaluable to a board, and 
dismissing them entirely would be too drastic a step.  The trick is to 
strike a balance that capitalizes on the valuable information benefits 
CEOs offer the board while minimizing the risk that the board will over-
rely on them.  Demoting the status of the CEO to that of an ex officio, 
nonvoting board member will encourage the board to weigh the CEO’s 
opinions and knowledge, but discount them when appropriate.  At the 
same time, this move dovetails with my purpose of contraction of board 
authority, which removes from the board’s task list functions for which 
directors might be especially inclined to over-rely on the CEO.  The 
CEO’s knowledge in the matters of CEO performance (including com-
pensation, removal, and succession), audit, takeovers, and other matters 
is relatively irrelevant.  CEOs can make their opinions and the pertinent 
facts known, and then be excused so that the voting board members can 
meet in executive succession. 
Eliminating all insiders save the CEO from the board would be a re-
form that is structurally easy to implement.  Because typically the CEO is 
the lone inside director (or one of two),89 the change would not be dis-
ruptive.  In many cases there would be no change in board membership 
at all.  Professors Kahan and Rock paint a picture of a board already 
well-equipped to operate without the CEO.90  Demoting CEOs to non-
voting member status and meeting in executive session to vote would 
strip them of much of their power, while retaining the benefits of having 
them on the board, and send a clear signal that the board should not—
within its limited jurisdiction—serve as a mere validation of the executive 
 
while CEO selection is an important role of the board, it is far from its only function in the corpora-
tion. 
 87. Mitchell, Structural Holes, supra note 86, at 1350.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition 
and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 921–22 (1999) (noting that the number of firms whose only 
inside director is the CEO is increasing and that more than fifty percent of the firms in the S&P 500 
have no more than two inside directors). 
 90. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 85, at 1044 (“Compared to outside directors fifteen years ago, 
outside directors today are likely to have more power, to enjoy a less collegial relationship to the in-
siders, to have a greater workload, to earn greater pay, to have occasional need to become confronta-
tional, and to deal more often with vocal and restive shareholders.”). 
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team’s decision.  At the same time, removing all non-CEO executives 
from the board would solidify the separate and distinct identity of the 
board as the place to go when conflict with management arises.  All sen-
ior executive officers would still have a fiduciary duty to keep the board 
informed of material information falling within its purview as further de-
scribed below. 
Having established the importance of a truly independent board, we 
can move to a consideration of those areas of conflict where the conflict 
primacy board would assume responsibility.  Two of these, the CEO-
related functions and the audit function, are regular tasks that would 
make up the bulk of the work of the board in a normal year.  Three other 
areas, related party transactions, takeovers, and derivative suits, would 
be occasional events for the board to deal with as the need arose.  Nota-
bly absent from the list of board responsibilities is the setting of overall 
corporate strategy on any level.  Such a task lies beyond the scope of an 
independent board’s competence and efficient use of decisional time; in-
dependence grants no advantage in the setting of strategy or making op-
erational decisions. 
C. Areas of Focus for the Conflict Primacy Board 
1. CEO-Related Functions: The Monitoring of CEO Performance, 
Setting of Compensation, and Succession Planning 
a. Executive Compensation 
Executive compensation is a fraught topic,91 but most commentators 
agree that boards should be the ones that determine executive pay as 
part of their role as CEO-monitors.92  The conflicts associated with exec-
utives setting their own pay are clear.  Tasking a group of outsiders with 
 
 91. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of 
the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 648–49 (2005) (describing the current state of executive compensation 
arrangements); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy? 
The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30 J. CORP. L. 675 (2005) (advocating that the 
SEC require publicly traded companies to disclose a statement detailing the compensation elements 
for each senior executive); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. 
L. REV. 1615 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: 
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)); John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO 
Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005) (reviewing 
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the 
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 753 (2002) (finding that managerial power 
is significant in determining executive compensation). 
 92. Most commentators implicitly recognize that boards should determine executive compensa-
tion.  See, e.g., Simone M. Sepe, Making Sense of Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 
224 (2011) (recognizing that boards run corporations and thus make compensation decisions); William 
W. Bratton, The Academic Tournament Over Executive Compensation, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1557, 1561 
(2005) (reviewing BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 91, and noting that boardroom practice in determin-
ing compensation “will never change absent robust criticism”). 
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the job of assessing CEO performance and structuring a compensation 
scheme in light of that performance makes good sense. 
So far so good.  Indeed, every publicly traded corporation has a 
compensation committee made up solely of independent directors.  What 
I advocate is a shift in emphasis and focus.  The task of CEO monitoring 
and compensation should be a focus of every independent member of the 
board—that is (according to my model), every member of the board.  
The completely independent board will admittedly lose the insider per-
spective of the CEO and any other management board members—but 
this perspective is of little legitimate use on the question of setting pay. 
Some might object that the same information asymmetries that pre-
vent the current board from managing effectively also hinder it from per-
forming the pay-setting monitoring role.  One response to this objection 
is the same one rightly made to critics of democratic self-rule: it is a terri-
ble system of governance, but it is still better than the alternatives.  No 
less important, three distinctive factors help to ameliorate the infor-
mation asymmetry problem in the executive-review context: first, Dodd-
Frank’s emphasis on empowering the compensation committee; second, 
the conflict primacy board has a narrower scope of responsibility and can 
thus focus its attention more effectively; and third, the stock market pro-
vides an initial indicator of performance. 
First, the Dodd-Frank Act emphasizes the importance of independ-
ent directors, advised by independent consultants, when setting executive 
pay.  Dodd-Frank directs the SEC to ensure the independence of the 
compensation committee and its advisors.93  Congress directed the SEC 
to ensure that each compensation committee has authority, in its sole 
discretion, to retain or obtain the advice of compensation consultants, 
independent legal counsel and other advisers.94  The Act further requires 
that “[t]he compensation committee of an issuer shall be directly respon-
sible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of a 
compensation consultant” and have “appropriate funding” to the com-
 
 93. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3). 
 94. Id.  In Rule 10C-1, the SEC defined the listing standards for compensation committees.  The 
factors that a compensation committee must consider in selecting a compensation adviser include:  
 Provision of other services to the issuer by the employer of the consultant, legal counsel or 
other advisor; 
 What percentage fees received from the issuer represent of total revenue of the employer 
of the consultant, legal counsel or other advisor; 
 Policies of the employer of the consultant, legal counsel or other advisor to prevent con-
flicts of interest; 
 Any business or personal relationship of the consultant, legal counsel or other advisor with 
any member of the compensation committee; 
 Any stock of the issuer owned by the consultant, legal counsel or other advisor (but not 
stock owned by his or her employer, or by its other employees); and 
 Any business or personal relationships between the executive officers of the issuer and the 
compensation adviser or the person employing the compensation advisor. 
Listing Standards for Compensation Committees, 77 Fed. Reg. 38,422, 38,430–33 (June 27, 2012) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.407). 
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pensation advisors.95  The compensation committee must disclose wheth-
er it retained a compensation consultant and if the consultant’s work 
raised any conflict of interest.96  Outside consultants have their draw-
backs; Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have described how the predis-
position for boards to view their CEOs as above average and compensate 
them accordingly has led to “an ever-increasing average and a continu-
ous escalation of executive pay.”97  Still, using them in conjunction with 
relegating the CEO to a less prominent role might foster more frank 
evaluations of a particular CEO’s worth. 
The conflict primacy model envisions the entire board fulfilling the 
role of the compensation committee, but Dodd-Frank’s insistence on the 
need for independent compensation advisors remains quite useful.  
Armed with its own counsel and consultants, the board would have the 
tools and the time to perform the limited task of evaluating high-level 
executives’ performance and pay.  Freed from the expectation that it 
would opine on matters of corporate policy or management, it could fo-
cus on the one part of corporate management where independence is tru-
ly an asset: evaluating the managers’ performance. 
Second, as Part II described, corporate directors face an array of 
tasks.  The managerial functions amount to second-guessing (more often, 
rubber-stamping) managerial decisions.  As Alces observes, “[t]he board 
can only do so much, in addition to what senior managers have already 
done, and it really only serves as a backstop, or a final quality check, be-
fore a major decision is finalized.”98  Taking tasks off the plate of the 
time-pressed board will enable it to focus on areas where its independ-
ence actually serves a useful purpose. 
Finally, as discussed above in Part III.B, Professor Jeffrey Gordon 
has suggested another factor ameliorating the information asymmetries 
facing the outside director: as the SEC has required the disclosure of ev-
er more and more detailed information, stock prices have become more 
informative, and thus independent directors can rely more on outside 
performance signals to assess the performance of the CEO and the man-
agement team.99  While stock performance is not the sole indicator of a 
CEO’s contribution to the corporation, at least it provides a benchmark.  
Boards can consider how the stock prices of competitors and other firms 
have fared, and the publicly disclosed levels at which those other CEOs 
have been compensated. 
I do not advocate a slavish short-termism when monitoring the 
CEO’s performance.  Recurring managerial complaints about being 
forced to manage earnings for the short term have validity, and CEOs 
 
 95. § 952, 124 Stat. at 1902. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 91, at 657. 
 98. Alces, supra note 49, at 800. 
 99. Gordon, supra note 37, at 1541–43. 
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should be able to make contrarian bets by funding unpopular research 
and development, or launching a product to which conventional wisdom 
has turned a skeptical eye.  But if a corporation’s stock consistently un-
derperforms that of its peers, the board should be more attuned to the 
issues of compensation and of succession. 
Equipped with these tools—compensation consultants, a narrower 
focus, and the information the public market affords—boards can begin 
to address the information asymmetries from which they suffer.  Addi-
tionally, a lack of on-the-ground information may be less of a problem in 
compensation than in other areas.  While CEOs have a firmer grasp on 
the costs and benefits of a particular corporate decision, they may not 
have a realistic notion of their worth to the corporation.  Most people 
probably think they are underpaid, and although each individual may 
have in some sense the most “informed” view on the subject, an outsid-
er’s perspective may generate the most accurate and fair result. 
b. Removal and Succession 
Removing a CEO is the ultimate exercise of the board’s monitoring 
power.  The power to fire and replace the CEO necessarily must reside 
with the board.  Coordination and collective action problems keep 
shareholders from fulfilling this role.  And because “[n]o man is allowed 
to be a judge in his own cause,”100 it is a decision that cannot reside with 
CEOs themselves.  Encouragingly, in the recent past boards have ap-
peared more willing to replace CEOs.101  Professors Kahan and Rock ar-
gue that this increase in CEO turnover signals greater “substantive inde-
pendence” among boards.102 
To credibly exercise its power to fire, a board must have a succes-
sion plan in place.  CEO succession is a crucial area for the board, 
whether or not its CEO is underperforming.103  The first job of the king is 
to produce an heir; similarly, boards should prioritize the identification 
of likely replacements for the CEO should death, disability, or public 
scandal require an unexpected departure from office.  CEO tenures are 
decreasing, and emergencies arise quickly.104  The SEC considers succes-
 
 100. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).   
 101. Kahan & Rock, supra note 85, at 1031. 
 102. Id. at 1030–32. 
 103. DENNIS C. CAREY & DAYTON OGDEN, CEO SUCCESSION 3 (2000) (noting “that succession 
has become a front-burner issue for directors”).   
 104. ABA Corporate Law Comm., supra note 75, at 986.  The Corporate Director’s Guidebook, a 
product of the ABA’s Committee on Corporate Laws, has shaped the development of corporate gov-
ernance since its first edition in 1978.  See Marshall L. Small, The 1970s: The Committee on Corporate 
Laws Joins the Corporate Governance Debate, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2011, at 129.  Now in 
its sixth edition, it recommends that the board as a whole or a separate succession committee pay at-
tention to this task:  
[T]he board should take an active role in assessing on an ongoing basis whether the current senior 
management team is appropriate for the needs of the organization, as well as in implementing 
and periodically reviewing management development and succession plans.  Through this pro-
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sion planning “a significant policy [and governance] issue” “so that [a] 
company is not adversely affected by a vacancy in leadership.”105 
CEOs often take for granted their right to anoint a successor,106 and 
if the presumptive heir is an internal candidate then the line of succession 
is often well defined.  Still, it is the board’s fundamental responsibility to 
be informed about this process and to have at its fingertips a short list of 
external and internal candidates should the need arise.107  Particularly if 
the board removes the CEO, it will not want to be tied to her choice of 
heirs.  Her flaws may extend to her choice of successor, who might favor 
the same policies and practices that led to the ousting. 
In succession planning, the board’s first responsibility is to identify 
the traits it considers most important in a CEO—a determination that is 
highly subjective, time consuming, and company-specific.  The board 
may consider insiders, outsiders, outsiders brought in for the purpose of 
replacing the CEO (“inside outsiders”), or even appoint existing direc-
tors to be the CEO.  Studies suggest that existing directors can be effec-
tive CEOs, while companies led by inside outsiders tend to underper-
form expectations.108  Insiders tend to be effective hires when taking over 
companies that are already well managed, and outsiders tend to be most 
effective in taking over companies that have problems, or need a change 
of direction.109 
No matter what the situation, the board must be able to identify 
credible candidates to replace the CEO well before a replacement is 
needed.  Therefore, the company should have a credible long-term talent 
development program in place to develop, assess, and groom potential 
leaders inside the company; indeed, some experts suggest planning on 
having a replacement identified up to four years ahead of the current 
CEO’s likely departure date.110  Managing such a process requires that 
boards have direct and regular contact with promising candidates, both 
on a formal and an informal basis, so that when the time comes, the 
board has enough information to make a wise decision as to whom the 
 
cess, boards gain the knowledge required to develop judgment about the corporation’s potential 
future leaders. 
 ABA Corporate Law Comm., supra note 75, at 986. 
 105. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E (CF) (Oct. 27, 2009). 
 106. See CAREY & OGDEN, supra note 103, at 8–9 (noting that in the past CEOs chose their suc-
cessors, and that CEOs often keep succession plans secret). 
 107. For a discussion of the CEO succession process and the board’s role in it, see Jay W. Lorsch 
& Rakesh Khurana, Changing Leaders: The Board’s Role in CEO Succession, HARV. BUS. REV., May-
June 1999, at 96 (a roundtable of corporate directors suggesting good practices for boards to follow in 
succession planning); see also Kenneth A. Borokhovich et al., Outside Directors and CEO Selection, 31 
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 337 (1996) (evaluating the empirical impact of outside directors 
on CEO selection). 
 108. James M. Citrin & Dayton Ogden, Succeeding at Succession, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2010, at 
29, 29–30.   
 109. Id. at 30. 
 110. Ram Charan, Ending the CEO Succession Crisis, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2005, at 72, 78 
(suggesting that management candidates should be recruited four years ahead of time).   
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next CEO should be.111  Boards should also work to identify “gaps” in 
management ranks that can be filled by proactively recruiting new talent 
via executive search firms. 
This is not to say that the board should shut the CEO out of the 
process of identifying possible successors.  Indeed, the board should ob-
tain the CEO’s feedback both when the CEO is retiring (as the CEO’s 
recommendation carries great weight in such a situation) and as an 
emergency plan is developed in case a new CEO has to be appointed 
immediately.112  Finally, it is critical that the board review the succession 
plan periodically and make sure that the process of grooming future 
leaders is working.  Appointing a CEO, after all, is likely the most im-
portant decision a board will ever make. 
One study suggests that firm performance may improve because of 
the removal threat an outside board presents.  Tod Perry and Ani 
Shivdasani compare outcomes for poorly performing firms with outside 
boards to similar firms without outside boards.  They hypothesize that 
after a drop in performance the CEO’s bargaining power diminishes and 
the CEO becomes more vulnerable, and is therefore more likely to initi-
ate restructuring activities.113  They find that firms with a majority of out-
side directors are twice as likely to initiate restructuring activities to re-
spond to the corporate crisis.114 
Finally, it is worth noting that, as Stephen Bainbridge has pointed 
out, a board’s evaluation of a CEO’s performance, and ultimately the 
removal decision, can have a decidedly managerial cast.  Bainbridge cri-
tiques Eisenberg’s monitoring board model for unrealistically character-
izing the board’s role as monitor as distinct from that of the managers, 
and for not acknowledging the “fuzzy” line between monitoring execu-
tive performance and managing the corporation itself.115  For example, if 
a board seeks to identify new candidates whose policy preferences match 
its own, then the board is clearly by its very choice recalibrating corpo-
rate policy—i.e., managing.116  Bainbridge is quite correct on this score; 
my response is that in certain cases management by nonmanagers is re-
quired and the best one can do is narrowly circumscribe the limits of cir-
cumstances where outsiders must make manager-like decisions. 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Many boards require the CEO to put together a “hit by a bus” plan, i.e., CEOs have to have 
a plan in place to make sure the company can be effectively run in the event they are incapacitated or 
otherwise unavailable.  See, e.g., Lorsch & Khurana, supra note 107, at 102 (suggesting that CEOs 
should leave instructions detailing what should happen if they “suddenly get[] hit by a trolley car”).   
 113. Tod Perry & Anil Shivdasani, Do Boards Affect Performance? Evidence from Corporate Re-
structuring, 78 J. BUS. 1403, 1404 (2005). 
 114. Id. at 1430. 
 115. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 61. 
 116. Id. at 61–62. 
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2. Audit Function 
The worst-case scenario for corporate governance is the unscrupu-
lous manager intent on fleecing the corporation and defrauding its 
shareholders.  Such rent-seeking represents the paradigmatic example of 
conflict of interest: shareholders clearly have conflicting interests with 
managers who are intent on lining their own pockets at the shareholders’ 
expense.  In the United States, disclosure is the regulatory tool of choice 
for combating fraud.117  In order for disclosure to be effective, however, it 
must be accurate.  Thus, to guard against fraud or inaccuracies born of 
managerial scheming or wishful thinking, the independent board should 
be entrusted with responsibility for the audit function. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 reinforced the independent direc-
tors’ critical role in the audit function, much as Dodd-Frank has 
strengthened that role with regard to executive compensation.118  As a re-
sult, basic legal structures are already in place that operationalize this el-
ement of the conflict primacy model.  Under my model, the entire board 
would be tasked with ensuring that the information reported to the SEC 
was accurate and fully complied with all applicable regulations.  Of 
course, the board would rely upon its independent counsel and external 
auditors in fulfilling this role, much as the audit committee does now.  
The conflict primacy model simply underscores the centrality of the 
board’s auditing task. 
Empirical support exists for the benefits of board independence in 
the auditing function.  It is true that Part III described that empirical 
studies have found no reliable relationship between board independence 
and overall performance.119  Given the part-time character of the typical 
U.S. board, this lack of correlation should come as no surprise.  Intri-
guingly, however, Professor Fairfax observes that “the strongest and 
most robust evidence indicating that directors have a positive impact on 
reducing fraud has emerged in the context of such directors’ role on the 
audit committee.”120  Studies have found that making audit committees 
more independent reduces internal control problems and reduces earn-
ings management.121  Studies have also correlated independent audit 
committees with smaller incidences of fraud and earnings restatements, 
 
 117. See, e.g., Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure As a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1093–94 (2007) (noting that the fundamental regulatory tool of the securities acts 
is disclosure).  Commentators frequently refer to Justice Brandeis’s famous quote: “[S]unlight is . . . 
the best of disinfectants.”  Id. at 1096 (omission in original). 
 118. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 201–09, 301, 116 Stat. 745, 771–77 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, j–l). 
 119. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 120. Fairfax, supra note 52, at 188 (citing Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley 
As Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1873–74 
(2007)). 
 121. Prentice & Spence, supra note 120, at 1873–74. 
RODRIGUES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/24/2013  1:54 PM 
No. 3] A CONFLICT PRIMACY MODEL OF THE PUBLIC BOARD 1077 
and with a lowered triggering of SEC enforcement actions.122  Professors 
Robert Prentice and David Spence conclude: “Overall, more independ-
ent audit committees tend to translate into better auditing, more in-
formative and credible earnings disclosure, and other benefits.”123 
The reliability of a corporation’s public numbers serves another im-
portant role for the conflict primacy board: accurate disclosures lead to 
more reliable stock prices, which aid in the board’s evaluation of execu-
tive performance.  The day-to-day monitoring of the CEO of a public 
corporation comes chiefly from the shareholders, expressed in the com-
pany’s market performance.  Shareholders constantly buy and sell ac-
cording to their perceptions based on the wealth of publicly available in-
formation.124  To ensure that the market is receiving accurate 
information, so that it can correctly price the company’s prospects, the 
board should control the auditing function, ensuring that it has inde-
pendent lines of communication in place with both internal and external 
auditors. 
The audit function encompasses more than simply monitoring CEO 
performance; it functions as a corrective to any insider malfeasance.  
Corporate employees have a natural tendency to bend or break the law 
in order to raise corporate profits and thus advance their own interests.125  
The law accordingly imposes sanctions to incentivize corporations to 
obey governing rules.126  Indeed, the oversight function of the board with 
respect to compliance with applicable laws and regulations has grown in 
importance in the modern era as corporate fines and settlements with 
regulators have become more draconian.  Both federal127 and state law 
(most notably the Caremark case128) create incentives for corporations to 
have effective compliance programs in place.  If a violation occurs, the 
presence of adequate internal training, prevention, and reporting systems 
are a key factor in assessing liability.129  The board should ultimately su-
pervise and monitor such systems, since insiders have incentives to risk 
illegal activities in order to pad the corporation’s bottom line. 
CEO evaluation, succession planning, and the audit function are 
routine functions that will likely occupy the bulk of the conflict primacy 
 
 122. Id. at 1874. 
 123. Id. at 1874–75.   
 124. Jeffrey Gordon argues that the board should carefully monitor market performance in order 
to evaluate CEO performance.  Gordon, supra note 37, at 1563. 
 125. See, e.g., Jean McGuire et al., CEO Incentives and Corporate Social Performance, 45 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 341, 342 (2003) (“Recent cases such as the Enron and WorldCom bankruptcies suggest that 
stock-based incentives may encourage executives to disregard social performance in pursuit of market 
price increases.” (citation omitted)). 
 126. See infra notes 144–46. 
 127. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2011) (reducing potential liability if the 
organization has an effective compliance program in place at the time of the offense). 
 128. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 129. Id.; id. § 8B2.1 cmt. background (2011) (“The prior diligence of an organization in seeking to 
prevent and detect criminal conduct has a direct bearing on the appropriate penalties and probation 
terms for the organization if it is convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense.”). 
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board’s limited time.  The next three Sections delineate occasional con-
flicts that the board should deal with if and when they arise. 
3. Related Party Transactions 
If any executive wishes to engage in a transaction with the corpora-
tion, the board should evaluate the transaction for fairness and negotiate 
vigorously on behalf of the corporation.  Related-party transactions oc-
cur occasionally and are reported in a corporation’s 10-K.130  Such trans-
actions may be innocent or even beneficial to the corporation.  For ex-
ample, a CEO might agree to allow the corporation to rent space in a 
family-owned facility at below-market rates.  The corporation may wish 
to use the CFO’s family business as a supplier because it produces the 
best product at the cheapest price.  Transactions of this kind, however, 
inevitably raise the specter of conflict of interest.  Traditionally such 
transactions were void or voidable.131  Delaware’s section 144 and the 
Model Act’s sections 8.60–.63, however, insulate them from shareholder 
attack if independent directors approve them.132  These transactions 
should not arise often, but when they do, the independent board should 
evaluate them with special care.  Reminding the board of the centrality 
of its role might help to prevent situations such as Enron’s board green-
lighting the special-purpose entities that its CFO Andrew Fastow used to 
move liabilities off Enron’s balance sheet—and to make millions of dol-
lars for himself in the process.133 
The corporate opportunity doctrine also highlights the modern 
board’s special role in policing conflicts.  If insiders are presented with a 
business opportunity that might also interest the corporation,134 the safest 
course is for them to present the opportunity to an independent board 
for approval.135  If the board elects not to pursue the opportunity, the in-
sider is free to do so.  As with insider self-dealing, however, evaluation of 
these sorts of corporate decisions requires an especially watchful role by 
the independent board. 
 
 130. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (2011). 
 131. Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 403 (Del. 1987) (recognizing a per se common-law rule 
that self-interested transactions were voidable). 
 132. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2013); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60–.63 (2011).  While 
these sections contain other circumstances under which related party transactions are permitted (no-
tably, when the shareholders ratify the transaction or when it is fair to the corporation), our concern is 
the cleansing director vote.  
 133. John R. Emshwiller & John M. Biers, Fastow Gets Six Years As Judge Calls for Mercy; Plea 
Deal Had Envisioned a Decade of Imprisonment; Ebbers Also Begins His Time, WALL ST. J., Sep. 27, 
2006, at A3. 
 134. Usha Rodrigues, From Loyalty to Conflict: Addressing Fiduciary Duty at the Officer Level, 61 
FLA. L. REV. 1, 16 n.68 (2009).  
 135. ABA Corporate Law Comm., supra note 75, at 995 (“If a director has reason to believe that 
a contemplated transaction might be a corporate opportunity, the director should bring it to the atten-
tion of the board and disclose the material information that the director knows about the opportunity.  
If the board, acting through its disinterested directors, disclaims interest in the opportunity on behalf 
of the corporation, then the director is free to pursue it.”).   
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4. Takeovers: Hostile and Friendly 
Perhaps the paramount case of shareholder/management conflict is 
that of a takeover bid, that is, when an offer is made to buy the shares or 
assets of the target corporation.  With a hostile bid the concern is that 
management intent on keeping their jobs might resist a sale desirable to 
shareholders.136  With a friendly bid the concern is that the managers will 
sell out shareholders at an unduly low price because of “sweetheart” 
deals that benefit them alone.137  Delaware law embraces the role of the 
independent special committee for the target in evaluating takeovers be-
cause takeovers typically involve these conflicts of interest.138  The con-
flict primacy model proposed here merely builds on Delaware law by re-
placing the special committee with the whole board. 
In a friendly merger (including situations as varied as par-
ent/subsidiary mergers, cash outs by majority shareholders forcing mi-
nority shareholders out of the business, and management buyouts), the 
conflict arises because directors have a duty to get a fair price for the 
shareholders, but insiders or friendly parties want to pay as little as pos-
sible.  In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,139 the Delaware Supreme Court sug-
gested that “an independent negotiating committee of . . . outside direc-
tors” could eliminate conflict and shift the burden during litigation.140  
Delaware courts have additionally held that when “a well functioning 
committee of independent directors”141 approves a merger with a control-
ling shareholder, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the transac-
tion is unfair.142 
As I have argued elsewhere, Delaware’s definition of independence 
is “situational,” meaning it cannot be determined ex ante.  Because Del-
aware courts evaluate both the relationship of directors with the acquir-
er143 and the directors’ actions to find out if the committee is independ-
 
 136. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olsen, Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Toward 
Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1484–85 (1991) (“Facing the real possi-
bility of losing both their jobs and their ability to determine the corporate fate upon becoming a target, 
management often seeks to wield corporate governance machinery to assure continued control.”). 
 137. David D. Haddock et al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. 
REV. 701, 738 (1987). 
 138. See Rodrigues, supra note 2, at 476–83 (2008) (describing the role of the special committee in 
evaluating mergers under Delaware law). 
 139. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).  Weinberger involved the buyout of UOP by Signal, which owned 
50.5% of UOP.  Id. at 704.  Two UOP directors who were also Signal directors proposed a report on 
the price Signal could pay, and the court found that they withheld information that should have been 
provided to the independent directors.  Id. at 708–09.  For this reason, the court held the transaction 
had not been approved by a majority of disinterested directors, and so the parent buyout would have 
to pass the intrinsic fairness test.  Id. at 710–14.  The court found that the requirements of fair price 
and fair dealing had not been met.  Id. 
 140. Id. at 709 n.7.  
 141. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 429–30 (finding the committee was not independent where all three directors were pre-
viously affiliated with the alleged controller and received significant financial compensation or were 
on the board of the alleged controller’s companies); In re MAXXAM, Inc., No. 12111 & 12353, 1997 
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ent, it may well be that board members that the NYSE would call “inde-
pendent” would not qualify as independent for the purposes of a particu-
lar transaction under Delaware law.  For example, even if a board mem-
ber has no ties to management, he or she may own the potential acquirer.  
Thus when a takeover looms the board should first determine who will 
qualify as independent for the purpose of evaluating that particular 
transaction.  The key policy goal of having a special committee is to en-
sure that there is “a truly independent, well informed and properly moti-
vated bargaining representative.”144  Thus, Delaware courts look to see if 
the “special committee was sufficiently independent, informed, and able 
and willing to bargain effectively with the interested party.”145  It may be 
that the whole board can fulfill this role, or it may need to form a sepa-
rate committee. 
In the case of hostile takeovers, the main potential conflict is man-
agement entrenchment: shareholders rightly fear that managers will re-
ject even an advantageous offer in order to keep their jobs.  In terms of 
adopting takeover defenses (most notably the poison pill) prospectively, 
Delaware law encourages approval by a supermajority of outside direc-
tors.146  Once a hostile offer is launched, Delaware law also requires a sit-
uational independence analysis.147  As with the friendly takeover, then, a 
conflict primacy board should enquire into any ties between each direc-
tor and the bidder and, if necessary, create a special committee to handle 
any negotiations.148 
5. Derivative Suits 
Finally, derivative suits are tailor-made for a conflict primacy board.  
The derivative suit is a mechanism whereby shareholders unhappy with 
corporate actions may file a suit on the corporation’s behalf.  The corpo-
rate form requires a neutral arbiter to determine whether a lawsuit is in-
deed a desirable course of action or would be a waste of corporate re-
sources, and the executives who make the daily management decisions 
that are likely the subject of the shareholders’ lawsuit clearly cannot 
 
WL 187317, at *20–22 (Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 1997) (finding that the special committee did not shift the bur-
den of proving fairness at trial because each member of the special committee had significant ties to 
the controlling shareholder).  
 144. MAXXAM, 1997 WL 187317, at *22. 
 145. Id. 
 146. In Unocal the Delaware Supreme Court held that having a board that consists of a “majority 
of outside independent directors” materially enhances the burden of proof of showing that there were 
“reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed.”  Un-
ocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 147. Rodrigues, supra note 2, at 482–83 (discussing Delaware’s inquiry into the independence of 
each board member from management and from the potential acquirer, and the reasonableness of its 
response).   
 148. When a firm’s breakup becomes inevitable, then the board’s role shifts to auctioneers, tasked 
with getting the best price for the company’s stockholders.  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
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serve this role.  The statutory mechanics vary,149 but the result is similar: 
the shareholders must prove that the board or committee deciding 
whether to sue is made up of independent directors.150 
Derivative suits come in two flavors: some alleging breach of the du-
ty of care, and others breach of the duty of loyalty (involving self-dealing, 
misappropriation of corporate opportunity, and the like).  A conflict 
primacy board offers the clear advantage of providing “untainted” direc-
tors in deciding whether to pursue claims that insiders have breached 
their duty of loyalty.  Duty of care claims are trickier, in that they gener-
ally involve challenges to the level of care taken in a particular action by 
the board.  Of course often the very board that authorized a certain ac-
tion—for example, Michael Ovitz’s no-fault termination that cost Disney 
$140 million151—will be the one whose independence is evaluated, and 
that prior authorization is not enough to disqualify the board members 
(otherwise plaintiffs could merely “bootstrap” their way to control of a 
lawsuit).152  And a conflict primacy board will be managing less, and so 
likely there will be less involvement with the decisions over which share-
holders choose to sue. 
D. Why a Board? 
 The reader may be left wondering whether, given the problems 
modern boards confront, boards will be any better suited to handling 
managerial conflicts of interest than they are to managing the corpora-
tion.  If the modern board is so dysfunctional, it should not be entrusted 
with this important task. 
 The first response to such an objection is that boards are better suit-
ed to the task than any other corporate player.  Stephen Bainbridge has 
defended locating a group, rather than an individual, at the top of the 
corporate hierarchy, because of the “clear advantages” that groups en-
joy.153  The work of experimental psychologists suggests that group deci-
sion making can outperform individual decision making,154 and collective 
action can counteract individual biases such as herding and overconfi-
dence.155  He concludes that “[c]orporate law’s strong emphasis on collec-
tive decisionmaking by the board thus seems to have a compelling effi-
ciency rationale.”156 
 
 149. Delaware recognizes situations of demand futility, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2013), 
while states adopting the Model Act framework have a “universal” demand requirement.  MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2011). 
 150. “Qualified” in the parlance of the Model Act.  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.43. 
 151. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 152. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 818 (Del. 1984). 
 153. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 54 (2002). 
 154. Id. at 18. 
 155. Id. at 27–30. 
 156. Id. at 19. 
RODRIGUES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/24/2013  1:54 PM 
1082 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 
 Nevertheless, boards are not perfect: as Bainbridge himself 
acknowledges, boards are subject to unique cognitive biases, such as 
groupthink, and unique sources of agency costs.157  Yet boards need not 
function perfectly for the conflict primacy model to work: they need only 
be the corporate constituency best suited to the task.  Managers self-
evidently cannot deal with managerial conflicts of interest effectively.  
Marshaling the shareholders to sanitize each and every conflict would be 
procedurally unwieldy: imagine having to identify a group of sharehold-
ers to pass judgment on each takeover offer or related party transaction 
that arose.  Issues of confidentiality and the dangers of extortionate be-
havior would also arise, particularly if the group of shareholders was 
large.  Given the board’s unique status as an embedded body of outsid-
ers, it is only logical to task it with dealing with managerial conflicts.   
E. Harmonizing Theory with Practice 
Eisenberg observed in 1976 that it was not the board, but the execu-
tives, who actually managed the corporation.158  His monitoring board 
was an attempt to change that reality.  Since 1976 there has certainly 
been a shift in rhetoric, but the reality of board detachment remains.  
Despite the move to supermajority independent boards, the CEO con-
tinues to be the decision maker of the modern public corporation.  Cor-
porate theory generally ignores this reality.  The director primacy model 
and the team production model center authority with the board in the 
face of calls for greater focus on the shareholder.  Yet both theories de-
scribe a board that does not exist—at least not for public corporations. 
The team production model envisions directors who are actively 
and constantly mediating between the various interests of labor, share-
holder, management, and perhaps the larger community.  The modern 
part-time board simply cannot take such an active role in management.  
As Alces points out, “Mediating between corporate constituents requires 
a solid working knowledge of the rights each party has against the corpo-
ration and the corporation’s reciprocal obligations.”159  But senior man-
agement knows much more about these issues than does the board, and 
the board will rely on the corporate officers to explain and contextualize 
the different claims of different constituencies that are vying for corpo-
rate resources.160  The board may of course hire outside advisors, but as 
outsiders these advisors will face the same informational difficulties.  
While the board lacks the same vested interests that management has, 
the constraints on its time and attention limit its ability to gather infor-
mation and mediate effectively.  In short, independent directors are ill-
 
 157. Id. at 54. 
 158. EISENBERG, STRUCTURE, supra note 5, at 140.   
 159. Alces, supra note 49, at 801. 
 160. Id.  
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equipped to serve as mediators of diverse and conflicting corporate-
constituency interests. 
The director primacy model, put forward by Professor Bainbridge, 
likewise asks too much of the modern board.  Bainbridge views the 
board as both the ultimate monitor and fiat-exerciser of the corpora-
tion.161  According to the conflict primacy model, neither of these roles 
fits the modern public board well.  First, Bainbridge relies on the board 
to monitor both the executives and itself.162  He lauds the ability of a 
group to provide better monitoring—indeed, to self-monitor and to con-
strain agency costs, while being less prone to capture than would be any 
single individual.163  In contrast, the conflict primacy model focuses the 
board’s monitoring solely on areas of conflict: setting the pay of the CEO 
and other high-level officers, monitoring their performance (and having a 
succession plan ready), and springing into action should another conflict 
arise, such as a takeover offer.  Other than that, the board should do very 
little. 
Bainbridge’s conception of the fiat-wielding power emphasizes the 
need for speed and authoritative control at the tactical level as a reason 
for rejecting shareholder primacy in favor of board authority.164  This 
analysis, however, involves a false choice because there is a third way for 
assigning the fiat-wielding power—that is, to assign it to the corpora-
tion’s officers.  Indeed, the capacity for speed and control is far removed 
from the modern-day realities of the part-time board.  In other words, 
someone does have to be in charge of the corporation—but the right per-
son is the CEO.  To be sure, CEOs cannot monitor themselves.  That has 
to be the job of the board.  And the good news is that a conflict primacy 
board with focused responsibilities that center on CEO monitoring and 
succession can be expected to move quickly and decisively in this area, in 
part because it has little else to do. 
To be fair, Bainbridge readily acknowledges that CEOs, not boards, 
run modern-day corporations, and that “statutory theory has long failed 
to translate into real world practice.”165  In one sense he can afford to be 
indifferent to the inadequacy of corporate law theory in practice, since 
 
 161. Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 7, at 567, 569. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Bainbridge, Nexus, supra note 26, at 29 (“The board solves that problem by creating a self-
monitoring hierarch whose internal governance structures provide incentives for optimal monitoring 
of its subordinates.  Mutual monitoring and social norms, enforced through peer pressure and reputa-
tional sanctions, provide important constraints on behavior.  In addition, a multi-member board is in-
herently harder for misbehaving subordinates to suborn than would be a single autocrat.  Instead of 
having to bribe or otherwise co-opt a single individual, the wrongdoers now must effect a conspiracy 
amongst a number of monitors.  Consequently, we vest corporate power in boards rather than individ-
uals so as to create an institutional constraint on agency costs.”). 
 164. Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 7, at 569. 
 165. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 19 (“Neither shareholders nor directors run the corporation; 
CEOs do.  Managerialism may have fallen out of favor as a normative theory of corporate governance, 
but it remains the work-a-day world reality.”). 
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the goal of Bainbridge’s director primacy project is to understand and 
justify the existing architecture of statutory corporate law.166 
As should by now be evident, I think there is much to recommend 
in Bainbridge’s notion of director primacy.  It is largely successful in its 
explanation of why corporate law statutes center power in a board of di-
rectors.  But corporate law statutes by necessity address both public and 
private corporations.  Federal intervention has ossified the public board 
into one specific incarnation: supermajority independent boards.  This 
subspecies of board, I argue, is constitutionally ill-suited for the general-
ized monitoring and fiat-wielding expected of it by the director primacy 
model.  Thus, the conflict primacy model best fits the realities of the 
modern public corporation. 
F. Back to Basics: Eisenberg’s Monitoring Board Revisited 
In many ways the conflict primacy board looks much like Eisen-
berg’s original monitoring board.  Indeed, Eisenberg’s argument made in 
1976 tracks in significant ways my own description of the board in 2013.  
After observing that “under the received legal model” the board manag-
es the corporation, Eisenberg added that, “in practice the board rarely 
performs either the management or the policymaking functions.”167  He 
went on to enumerate the constraints on time and information that im-
pede directors in their work.  He lamented that the board of the day was 
composed of people “economically or psychologically dependent upon or 
tied to the corporation’s executives, particularly its chief executive.”168 
Eisenberg next described the four functions of the board: 
“[P]roviding advice and counsel to the office of the chief executive; au-
thorizing major corporate actions; providing a modality by which persons 
other than executives can be formally represented in corporate deci-
sionmaking; and selecting and dismissing the members of the chief exec-
utive’s office and monitoring that office’s performance.”169  It is the 
fourth function that he termed the monitoring function.  And, anticipat-
ing the analysis I offer here, Eisenberg emphasized that this function is 
“both of critical importance to the corporation and uniquely suited for 
performance by the board.”170 
 Part-timers, he continued, will never be as good at “managing the 
corporation’s business” or making corporate policy as full-time employ-
ees.171  It was absurd to think that they might.  Eisenberg observed, how-
 
 166. Yet Bainbridge does suggest that the balance of power is moving from “imperial CEOs” to 
boards.  Id. 
 167. EISENBERG, STRUCTURE, supra note 5, at 139. 
 168. Id. at 145. 
 169. Id. at 157–68. 
 170. Id. at 162. 
 171. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: 
Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 375, 387 (1975) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Legal 
Models]. 
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ever, that there is one function the board can perform, and perform bet-
ter than any other corporate group: “[S]electing, monitoring, and remov-
ing the members of the chief executive’s office.”172 
Somehow over time, this specialized, CEO-centered focus on the 
monitoring function of the board lost its sharpness of definition.  Loose 
translations of “monitoring” that embraced the corporation’s operations 
more generally, crept into this reconception of the core board role.  The 
conflict primacy board attempts to bring us back to Eisenberg’s central 
insight as to what a board is best suited to do.  But the conflict primacy 
board, while encompassing Eisenberg’s originally conceived monitoring 
board, has broader authority than Eisenberg envisioned.  The conflict 
primacy board is the place for the resolution of any conflict that pits 
shareholder against top management.  The independent board thus must 
supervise the audit function because the auditor certifies that the finan-
cial information provided to the shareholders is accurate.  And the board 
has a role to play if the CEO, or any officer, seeks to transact business 
with the corporation.  In contrast, Eisenberg wrote that “[i]n duty-of-
loyalty cases the courts have often given disproportionate weight to the 
fact that outside directors have approved a transaction in which execu-
tives are interested.”173  What he missed in this line of thought is that the 
chief function of the board of directors—at least if composed of outside 
directors—is to provide a mechanism for resolving managerial conflicts 
of interest of any flavor.  That is, the independent board’s role should not 
be limited to the selection, monitoring, and removal of the CEO.  When-
ever a conflict arises, the independent public board has a role to play. 
Interestingly, Eisenberg himself raised the possibility of a wholly in-
dependent board, stating that its advantages were “obvious”: “Since the 
board’s principal function is to monitor management’s performance, and 
since a director who is not independent can scarcely be trusted to per-
form that function, board membership for such persons seems counter-
productive.”174  In the end, he concluded that the law should favor a ma-
jority independent board.  The wholly independent board, he reasoned, 
would involve an “unacceptably sharp break with tradition.”175  In addi-
tion, because many public firms already had several outside directors, he 
worried that a more aggressive change would be too disruptive.176  Final-
ly, Eisenberg argued that allowing a “structural overlap” between man-
agement and the board could encourage management to take important 
issues to the board on “at least a pro forma basis.”177  With the benefit of 
thirty-five years’ experience, I argue that these “pro forma” gestures 
have clouded the monitoring board’s essential purpose, while eating up 
 
 172. EISENBERG, STRUCTURE, supra note 5, at 170. 
 173. Eisenberg, Legal Models, supra note 171, at 384. 
 174. EISENBERG, STRUCTURE, supra note 5, at 172.   
 175. Id. at 174. 
 176. Id. at 174–75. 
 177. Id. at 175.   
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scarce director time.  Based on Eisenberg’s own core reasoning, laid out 
more than thirty years ago, it is high time to demote the CEO to the posi-
tion of nonvoting ex officio board member and to remove all other insid-
ers from the board. 
The conflict primacy board directly addresses the concerns articu-
lated in Part III regarding the time constraints and lack of information 
possessed by an independent board.  The board need not be updated 
about the ins and outs of the corporation’s business.  Its focus on the 
chief executive’s performance and the audit function is its strength.  The 
beauty of the conflict primacy model is that it turns the independent di-
rector’s chief liability into an asset.  The conflict primacy board member 
need not have an intimate or even general knowledge of the industry or 
the corporation itself, only good judgment and an eye on its narrow 
mandate. 
V. OBJECTIONS 
A. Statutory Difficulties 
As Part II described, the major corporate statutes require that the 
corporation’s affairs be managed by or under the direction of the board 
of directors.  One might argue that the conflict primacy board impermis-
sibly delegates the managerial function to the executive. 
I argue that these statutory provisions mesh well with the conflict 
primacy board.  In the 1970s corporate codes were amended to add that 
the corporation is managed by “or under the direction of” the board of 
directors—a nod to the changed reality of corporate America.178  Residu-
al control, the ultimate control over the corporation, lies with the board: 
it delegates its power to CEOs, but it retains the power to remove them, 
and thus ultimate control over the corporation.  Corporate management 
in the conflict primacy model remains “under the direction of” the board 
of directors.  As discussed in the introduction, I defer more detailed 
questions of implementation for the present time. 
 
 178. The phrase was added to the Delaware General Corporation Law by the Delaware Legisla-
ture on July 11, 1974, taking effect on July 1, 1974.  The Committee on General Corporation Law stat-
ed that the amendment “makes explicit the present law that the duty of directors to ‘manage’ the cor-
poration may be carried out by officers and employees under the direction of the board.  Thus, the 
directors’ role usually is formulating policy and directing officers to conduct the day-today opera-
tions.”  GEN. CORP. LAW COMM., DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N, COMMENTARY ON LEGISLATIVE 
PROPOSALS FOR THE 127TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SECOND SESSION, 1974 § 2 (1974), available at 
http://law.widener.edu/LawLibrary/Research/OnlineResources/DelawareResources/DelawareCorpora
tionLawDocuments.aspx.   
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B. Shouldn’t We Expect More from Directors? Opting into a More 
Robust Board 
Perhaps the biggest problem with the conflict primacy board is also 
its primary strength: it declines to ask much of the board.  This Article 
argues thus far that, given the way independence is defined and corpo-
rate boards are constituted, requiring anything more than dealing with 
areas of conflict would be foolhardy.  While every corporation would like 
to have an intelligent, active, engaged board—the Platonic Ideal board—
none of those qualities are, or indeed can be, required by law.179 
Boards can contribute much more to the life of a corporation than 
merely handling conflict.  Indeed, a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey 
found that most directors would like to spend more time on areas such as 
strategic planning and risk management.180  Engaged board members, 
drawn from the corporation’s industry or related ones, or those who have 
taken the enormous amount of time required to familiarize themselves 
with areas of corporate strategy or market trends, have much to offer the 
corporation lucky enough to have them.181  I am deferring the implemen-
tation question for another day, but, in general terms, corporations 
would be free under the conflict primacy board to give their boards a 
greater role, either by way of their organizational documents (i.e., adopt-
ing an amendment to the articles of incorporation or a bylaw approved 
by the shareholders that tasks the board with substantive managerial du-
ties) or simply by promoting the fact of their knowledgeable, active, and 
engaged board membership.  Such corporations would be free to tout 
their more robust boards as a distinguishing feature of corporate govern-
ance that enhances shareholder value.  The conflict primacy board sets 
the minimum that we require of boards, but in individual corporations 
they could take on a more substantive role. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Boards play a pivotal role in corporate law theory, yet this Article 
has shown that they do not and cannot sustain this role in practice.  
Modern public boards, composed almost entirely of outsiders with only 
incomplete knowledge of the corporation’s inner workings and limited 
 
 179. The only substantive positive requirement is that Sarbanes-Oxley’s de facto requirement that 
the audit committee have one financial expert.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 
§ 407, 116 Stat. 745, 790 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265).  
 180. Pricewaterhouse Coopers, The 2011 Proxy Season: Say on Pay, PWC TO THE POINT: 
CURRENT ISSUES FOR BOARDS OF DIRECTORS, Winter 2011, at 1, 3, available at http://pwc.com/us/ 
en/corporate-governance/assets/to-the-point-current-issues-for-boards-of-directors-winter-2011.pdf. 
 181. Lynne Dallas’s suggestion of dual boards, one focused on conflicts and one focused on rela-
tional functions, may serve as one avenue for a corporation to enjoy the benefits of both kinds of 
boards.  Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Dual Board and 
Board Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91 (1997).  My suggestion parts company from Dal-
las’s by emphasizing the centrality and primary necessity of the conflict primacy board. 
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time in which to manage the corporation, simply cannot effectively fulfill 
the myriad tasks expected of them.  The dominant monitoring board 
model has enlarged to the point where boards are expected to make stra-
tegic choices they are ill-equipped to handle.  The leading competing 
models of the corporation, Blair and Stout’s team production model and 
Bainbridge’s director primacy model, likewise expect unrealistically en-
gaged behavior from the modern independent board. 
This Article proposes embracing the modern public board’s inde-
pendence by employing it where it will be most useful: in areas where 
management faces a conflict of interest.  Circumscribing the board’s role 
in this manner will enable it to focus on areas—CEO evaluation, com-
pensation, and succession, audit, related party transactions, takeovers, 
and derivative suits—where outside status serves as a strength, not a 
weakness.  To underline the conflict primacy function of the board, I ad-
vocate removing all inside directors, retaining only the CEO as an ex of-
ficio, nonvoting board member.  Thus reconstituted and refocused, the 
board in the conflict primacy model of the public corporation will serve a 
vital function: managing the corporation where—and only where—the 
managers cannot. 
 
